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Abstract—Loss of control remains one of the largest contributors 
to fatal aircraft accidents worldwide.  Aircraft loss-of-control 
accidents are complex, resulting from numerous causal and 
contributing factors acting alone or more often in combination.  
Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these 
accidents.  This paper summarizes recent analysis results in 
identifying worst-case combinations of loss-of-control accident 
precursors and their time sequences, a holistic approach to 
preventing loss-of-control accidents in the future, and key 
requirements for validating the associated technologies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Aircraft loss of control (LOC) is one of the largest 
contributors to fatal accidents across all vehicle classes and 
operational categories [1], [2], and [3].  The 2010 Boeing 
report of Ref. [1] summarizes commercial jet airplane 
accidents that occurred worldwide between 1959 and 2009 
involving aircraft that are heavier than 60,000 pounds 
maximum gross weight.  In this report, aircraft loss-of-control 
is the leading fatal accident category, with 20 accidents 
occurring in this time period that resulted in 1,848 fatalities.  
The 2008 report of Ref. [2] on worldwide fatal accidents by 
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Safety Regulation Group 
in the United Kingdom (UK) determined LOC to be the 
second-leading consequence (38.9%, 110 of 283 accidents) 
resulting from numerous causal and contributing factors – 
second only to post-crash fire.  The report by Alliant 
Techsystems of Ref. [3] looked across all U.S. operational 
categories (Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Non-Scheduled Part 
135 and Part 91) between 1988 and 2004 and found that 
aircraft loss of control accidents “were responsible for more 
than half of the aviation fatalities during that time period” – 
despite having contributed to less than 20% of the U.S. 
aviation accidents in the data set.   
Aircraft LOC is also complex, resulting from numerous 
causal and contributing factors acting alone or more often in 
combination.  In Reference [ 4 ], 74 LOC accidents were 
reviewed for the time period 1993 – 2007, which resulted in 
42 hull loss accidents and 3241 fatalities. The analysis of this 
reference groups the accidents into the categories aerodynamic 
stall, flight control system, spatial disorientation of the crew, 
contaminated airfoil, and atmospheric disturbance.  There is 
also a detailed discussion of accidents in each of these 
categories and a comparison with older accidents that occurred 
prior to 1993 in order to identify emerging trends.  This 
reference also provides a definition of aircraft upset 
conditions, which is defined therein as “any uncommanded or 
inadvertent event with an abnormal aircraft attitude, rate of 
change of aircraft attitude, acceleration, airspeed, or flight 
trajectory”.   Due to the complexity of LOC accidents, no 
single intervention strategy can be identified to prevent them. 
This paper summarizes key recent results presented in 
References [5], [6], and [7] to address aircraft loss of control.  
Ref. [5] presents a detailed analysis of LOC accidents in 
which worst case combinations of causal and contributing 
factors are identified as well as how they sequence in time.  
Future potential risks are also identified.  Ref. [6] presents a 
future integrated systems concept for preventing aircraft LOC 
accidents, and Ref. [7] presents requirements and a process for 
their validation and verification (V&V), with an emphasis on 
validation.  Key results from these references are summarized 
in Sections II, III, and IV, respectively.  Section V provides a 
summary and some concluding remarks. 
II. AIRCRAFT LOC ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
A review of 126 LOC accidents (predominantly from Part 
121, including large transports and smaller regional carriers) 
occurring between 1979 and 2009 (30 years) that resulted in 
6087 fatalities was performed for the analysis, and a listing of 
these accidents is provided in the Appendix of Ref. [5].  This 
accident set does not represent an exhaustive search 
throughout this time period, and it does not include military, 
private, cargo, charter, and corporate accidents.  Russian 
aircraft accidents were also excluded due to a general lack of 
detailed information in the associated reports.  Of this total 
accident set, 91 accidents resulting in 4190 fatalities occurred 
between 1994 and 2009 (15 years).  The review was based on 
accident reports available on the Aviation Safety Network [8] 
and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) [ 9 ] 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110012012 2019-08-30T15:41:58+00:00Z
websites.  The level of detail in analyzing each accident was 
therefore dependent on the level of detail provided in the 
accident reports.  Information from each report was 
transcribed into a categorized set of causal and contributing 
factors, using the following scheme.  The causal and 
contributing factors were grouped into three categories: 
adverse onboard conditions, vehicle upsets, and external 
hazards and disturbances.   
Adverse onboard conditions included:  
 vehicle impairment (including inappropriate vehicle 
configuration, contaminated airfoil due to icing, and improper 
vehicle loading);  
 system faults, failures, and errors (resulting from design flaws, 
software errors, or improper maintenance actions);  
 vehicle damage to airframe and engines (resulting from fatigue 
cracks, foreign objects, overstress during upsets or upset 
recovery, etc.); and  
 inappropriate crew response (including pilot-induced 
oscillations, spatial disorientation, mode confusion, ineffective 
recoveries, crew impairment, and failures to take appropriate 
actions).
External hazards and disturbances included:  
 poor visibility;  
 wake vortices;  
 wind shear, turbulence, and thunderstorms;  
 snow and icing conditions; and  
 abrupt maneuvers for obstacle avoidance or collisions.   
Vehicle upsets included:  
 abnormal attitude;  
 abnormal airspeed, angular rates, or asymmetric forces;  
 abnormal flight trajectory;  
 uncontrolled descent (including spiral dive); and  
 stall/departure from controlled flight.   
A basic analysis of the contributions of each 
causal/contributing factor to the 126 accidents is given in 
Table 1.  It should be noted in Table 1 that the factors are not 
mutually exclusive.  For example, 119 LOC accidents 
involved one or more adverse onboard conditions, and the 
frequency of each individual factor within this category is 
listed.  These numbers do not add up to 119, however, because 
there were many accidents involving more than one subfactor.  
Similarly, adding the number of accidents listed for the three 
categories exceeds the 126 total because many accidents 
involved multiple categories.  The 23 accidents related to 
vehicle damage consisted of 20 airframe and system damage 
conditions, and 3 engine damage conditions.  Table 1 is useful 
for determining the number of accidents and fatalities 
associated with individual causal and contributing factors, but 
it does not provide any information on combinations or 
sequencing of these factors.  Nonetheless, this table identifies 
System Faults/Failures/Errors, Vehicle Impairment/Damage, 
Inappropriate Crew Response, Stall/Departure, Atmospheric 
Disturbances related to Wind Shear/Gusts, and Snow/Icing as 
the most significant contributors to the number of fatalities. 
The following subsections A and B address combinations and 
sequencing of LOC causal and contributing factors, 
respectively.  Subsection C addresses future risks. 
Table 1. Contributions to LOC Accidents and Fatalities by  
Individual Causal and Contributing Factors [5]
A. Worst Case Analysis 
In order to identify worst case combinations of LOC causal 
and contributing factors (as defined by number of accidents 
and resulting fatalities), 3-dimensional scatter plots were 
generated. Figure 1 shows the key result from this analysis.   
Figure 1.  Identification of Overlap in LOC Causal and 
Contributing Factor Combinations, 1979 – 2009 [5].
The three dimensions are aligned with the three categories 
identified in Table 1.  Sphere size is directly proportional to 
the number of accidents, and sphere color depicts the number 
of fatalities as indicated by the legend.  As indicated in Figure 
1, worst case combinations include: system faults and failures 
occurring alone and in combination with upsets, icing 
conditions resulting in vehicle impairment, and inappropriate 
crew response combined with upset conditions.  There are also 
a significant number of accidents and fatalities resulting from: 
Factor Accidents % Fatalities %
Adverse Onboard Conditions 119 94.4 5683 93.4
Vehicle Impairment 33 26.2 1134 18.6
System Faults / Failures / Errors 57 45.2 2807 46.1
Vehicle Damage 23 18.2 1780 29.2
Inappropriate Crew Response 54 42.8 2818 46.3
Vehicle Upsets 98 77.8 4523 74.3
Abnormal Attitude 18 14.3 219 3.60
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular Rates / Asymmetric Forces 14 11.1 701 11.5
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 4 3.2 272 4.47
Uncontrolled Descent 15 11.9 773 12.7
Stall / Departure 49 38.9 2622 43.1
External Hazards & Disturbances 61 48.4 3246 53.3
Poor Visibility 9 7.1 556 9.1
Wake Vortices 4 3.2 402 6.6
Wind Shear / Gusts / Thunderstorms 18 14.3 1126 18.5
Snow / Icing 28 22.2 595 9.8
Abrupt Maneuver / Collision 3 2.4 189 3.1
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vehicle damage occurring alone and combined with upsets, 
icing combined with inappropriate crew response and upsets, 
and wind shear and turbulence combined with inappropriate 
crew response and vehicle upsets.  As noted in Figure 1 with 
red text, there is some overlap (i.e., some combinations that 
are not mutually exclusive) in the scatter plot, especially 
within the adverse onboard conditions dimension.  This 
overlap is due to a significant number of accidents that 
involved multiple adverse onboard conditions.  For example, 
some of the accidents shown for system faults and failures also 
involved inappropriate crew response.  Alternatively, many of 
the accidents shown for inappropriate crew response also 
involved other adverse onboard conditions, such as vehicle 
impairment, failure, or damage.  While there is some overlap 
in the external hazards and disturbances and the vehicle upset 
dimensions, it is generally much smaller that the onboard 
dimension. 
Ref. [5] also analyzed the most recent 15 years of accident 
data in the set, as well as those involving no fatalities, in order 
to identify any emerging issues.  No significant emergent 
trends were evident. 
B. Time Sequence Analysis 
An analysis of the time sequencing of the LOC causal and 
contributing factors was performed for the 30-year data set. 
Table 2 provides a summary of this sequencing.   
Table 2. Sequencing of LOC Causal & Contributing Factors [5]
It should be noted that these sequences were identified without 
overlap.  That is, there is no “double bookkeeping” of 
sequences in Table 2.  Thus, the total number of initiating 
factors under column 1 sums to the total number of LOC 
accidents, since all LOC accidents result from at least 1 causal 
or contributing factor.  Table 2 indicates that LOC events are 
usually first precipitated by an adverse onboard condition or 
an external hazard or disturbance.  Moreover, external hazards 
and disturbances rarely occur further downstream in LOC 
sequences.  Vehicle upsets are rarely the initial factor but 
rather an outcome of an external hazard or adverse onboard 
condition.  Within adverse onboard conditions, system faults, 
failures, and errors are the leading initial factor, and 
inappropriate crew response is the second most likely initial 
event.  Relative to external hazards and disturbances, the 
leading initial factor is icing, followed by wind shear, gusts, 
and thunderstorms.  Adverse onboard conditions are also the 
most likely factor to occur second in the chain of events 
leading to aircraft LOC, with vehicle impairment being the 
most likely secondary factor to occur.  This is due to vehicle 
impairment resulting from icing conditions (i.e., contaminated 
airfoil or reduced engine performance), faults or damage.  
Vehicle upsets most often occur as the second, third, or fourth 
factor in the LOC sequence.  Only one 5-factor sequence was 
identified in this data set.   
An analysis was also performed of each LOC sequence.  
This analysis is summarized in Table 3.   
Table 3. Summary of LOC Accident Sequences [5]
Table 3 provides the number of accidents and fatalities (and 
associated percentages) relative to each causal and 
contributing factor as the initial factor in the LOC sequence.  
Defining the LOC sequences in terms of the initiating factor 
allowed a comprehensive assessment without overlap.   As 
indicated in Table 3, LOC events initiated by adverse onboard 
conditions comprised 54.8% of the accidents and 61.3% of the 
fatalities within the data set considered in this analysis.  Of 
these, system failures, faults, and errors initiated 33.3% of 
accidents and 29% of fatalities, followed by inappropriate 
crew response, vehicle damage, and vehicle impairment.  
External hazards and disturbances initiated 42.8% of the 
accidents and 36.6% of the fatalities in the LOC accidents 
considered.  Within this category, icing represented 21.4% of 
accidents and 9.7% of fatalities, whereas wind shear, 
turbulence, and thunderstorms initiated 11.1% of accidents 
and 14.4% of fatalities.  These factors were followed in 
Factor 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Adverse Onboard Conditions 69 69 24 6 0
Vehicle Impairment 3 29 3 0 0
System Faults / Failures / Errors 42 11 4 0 0
Vehicle Damage 6 7 5 5 0
Inappropriate Crew Response 18 22 12 1 0
External Hazards & Disturbances 54 6 0 0 0
Poor Visibility 7 0 0 0 0
Wake Vortices 3 1 0 0 0
Wind Shear / Gusts / Thunderstorms 14 3 0 0 0
Snow / Icing 27 1 0 0 0
Abrupt Maneuver / Collision 3 1 0 0 0
Vehicle Upsets 3 36 47 15 1
Abnormal Attitude 0 12 3 3 0
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular Rates / 
Asymmetric Forces
0 3 7 4 0
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 1 1 3 1 0
Uncontrolled Descent 0 5 7 2 1
Stall / Departure 2 15 27 5 0
Initial Factor in LOC Sequence Accidents % Fatalities %
Adverse Onboard Conditions 69 54.8 3733 61.3
Vehicle Impairment 3 2.4 186 3.1
System Faults / Failures / Errors 42 33.3 1544 29.0
Vehicle Damage 6 4.8 908 14.9
Inappropriate Crew Response 18 14.3 1095 14.3
External Hazards & Disturbances 54 42.8 2228 36.6
Poor Visibility 7 5.5 438 7.2
Wake Vortices 3 2.4 137 2.2
Wind Shear / Gusts / Thunderstorms 14 11.1 874 14.4
Snow / Icing 27 21.4 590 9.7
Abrupt Maneuver / Collision 3 2.4 189 3.1
Vehicle Upsets 3 2.4 126 2.1
Abnormal Attitude 0 0 0 0
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular Rates / 
Asymmetric Forces
0 0 0 0
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 1 0.8 117 1.9
Uncontrolled Descent 0 0 0 0
Stall / Departure 2 1.6 9 0.2
Totals 126 100 6087 100
frequency of occurrence by poor visibility, wake vortices, and 
abrupt maneuver or collision (with the last two having the 
same frequency of occurrence).  It is interesting to note that 
icing initiated more accidents, but wind-related disturbances 
resulted in more fatalities.  This is because the predominance 
of icing-induced accidents in the data set of this study 
involved smaller aircraft, whereas the preponderance of wind-
induced accidents in this data set involved large transports.  As 
indicated previously, vehicle upsets are rarely the precipitating 
factor in the LOC sequence, with these comprising 2.4% of the 
accidents and 2.1% of the fatalities considered in this study.  
Within this category, stall/departure initiated 1.6% of the 
accidents and 0.2% of fatalities, and abnormal flight trajectory 
initiated 0.8% of accidents and 1.9% of fatalities in the data 
set.  While upsets are not usually the precipitating factor, 
many LOC sequences include vehicle upset somewhere in the 
chain of events (as indicated in Table 2).   
Ref. [5] identified 52 unique LOC sequences from the 
accident data.  In order to condense these sequences into 
smaller, more actionable groupings, they were also combined 
and generalized.  The generalized sequences from Ref. [5] are 
shown in Figure 2 along with the associated number of 
accidents and fatalities.   
Figure 2.  Generalized LOC Accident Sequences [5].
Dashed boxes in Figure 2 represent factors that occurred in 
some subset within the sequence.  These 7 generalized 
sequences represent 112 accidents (88.9%) and 5529 fatalities 
(90.8%).   
C. Future Potential Risks 
In addition to looking at historical accident data, potential 
future LOC accident risks should be identified relative to 
known (as well as new) precursors.  This is more difficult, 
because (without data) it becomes more speculative.  
However, the identification of potential areas of vulnerability 
might enable the development of a comprehensive 
intervention strategy that anticipates and mitigates these future 
potential risks.  One area of consideration is airspace operation 
under the Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation 
System [10].   The NextGen concept of operations provides an 
integrated view of airspace operations in the 2025 timeframe 
and includes high-density, all-weather, and self-separation 
operational concepts.  There is also expected to be mixed-
capability aircraft operating within the same airspace, 
including piloted aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems.  
High-precision 4-D trajectories are envisioned that will enable 
safely flying with closer spacing to inclement weather, terrain, 
and other aircraft, and these trajectories can be altered if 
necessary during the flight.  Other areas of consideration 
include increasing airspace and vehicle system complexity 
without developing comprehensive methods for their 
validation and verification (V&V), and increased automation 
without improved crew interfaces. 
In an effort to identify areas of potential future LOC risk in 
terms of known precursors, Figure 3 illustrates several areas of 
possible increase in causal and contributing factors with the 
potential for increased LOC accidents or incidents.   
Figure 3.  Potential Areas of Future Increased LOC Risk [5].
If all-weather operations and highly precise trajectories that 
enable closer spacing to inclement weather increase the 
probability of an aircraft actually encountering a weather 
hazard during flight, this could result in a larger number of 
weather-related LOC accidents (particularly in the terminal 
area).  If airspace and vehicle system complexity is increased 
without comprehensive methods for their V&V, this could 
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lead to a larger number of LOC events initiated by system 
faults, failures, and errors.  If high-density mixed-vehicle 
operations and high-precision tracking that enables closer 
spacing between aircraft increase the probability of aircraft 
encountering other aircraft during flight, this could result in a 
larger incidence of wake-induced LOC events or ultimately 
those initiated by vehicle damage resulting from mid-air 
collisions.  Increased automation without improved crew 
interfaces could result in a higher incidence of LOC events 
precipitated by inappropriate crew actions.  New LOC 
precursors associated with failure modes of future vehicle and 
airspace systems must also be identified and considered during 
V&V of these systems, and their potential ramifications 
considered under off-nominal operating conditions.  New 
types of crew-induced LOC precursors must also be 
considered. 
III. FUTURE SYSTEM CONCEPT
Due to the complexity of aircraft LOC events (i.e., accidents 
and incidents), no single intervention strategy can be identified 
to effectively prevent them.  Moreover, there are currently no 
coordinated or integrated systems or research efforts for 
addressing aircraft LOC.  Current aircraft control systems are 
primarily designed for operation under nominal conditions, 
and often disengage (i.e., return control authority to the pilot) 
under off-nominal conditions.  Current flight deck systems 
provide limited information under off-nominal conditions 
associated with aircraft LOC.  While many current systems 
have built-in tests for assessing system, subsystem, or 
component health, these lack the integrated capability for 
assessing vehicle health across them, or for the prevention of 
cascading failures across multiple systems.  There is also no 
existing capability to assess vehicle health and external 
hazards in terms of their impact on flight safety.  Improved 
crew training and operational procedures for off-nominal 
conditions might enable improved crew response during LOC 
events, but this is dependent on the capability to effectively 
characterize vehicle dynamics and control characteristics 
under off-nominal conditions.  Advanced onboard systems that 
provide effective detection and resilience under off-nominal 
conditions could enable improved situational awareness and 
vehicle response under LOC events, but this requires the 
effective integration and validation of the associated 
technologies.
The analysis of Section II can provide insight into 
preventing LOC accidents.  Figure 4 shows an example 
generalized sequence from Figure 2 with an intervention 
strategy defined to break the sequence at all stages via 
avoidance, detection, mitigation, and recovery technologies.  
Avoidance technologies include enhanced models and 
simulations for characterizing LOC conditions for improved 
crew training, advanced vehicle and system design methods 
that reduce failures and damage, and forward-looking sensors 
for avoidance of external hazards and disturbances.  Detection 
technologies include vehicle health management technologies 
that provide the capability to prevent catastrophic failure 
through early anomaly detection as well as rapid failure 
detection and isolation onboard the aircraft. Mitigation 
technologies include failsafe guidance and control systems 
that ensure stability, maximize vehicle performance and 
handling qualities, and enable safe maneuvering under LOC 
conditions, as well as flight deck interface systems that 
provide improved crew situational awareness, 
countermeasures for crew errors, and variable autonomy to 
optimize the synergy between the crew and automation.  The 
mitigation technologies would also include specific functions 
for upset prevention under LOC conditions.  Recovery 
technologies include guidance and control algorithms for safe 
and reliable upset recovery. These algorithms would prevent 
entry into unrecoverable conditions, and would include vehicle 
constraints during the recovery (e.g., normal structural loading 
constraints as well as vehicle constraints resulting from 
impairment or damage).  Variable autonomy interface 
functions would be utilized to optimize involvement between 
the crew and the system.  Figure 5 presents a holistic approach 
for developing the technologies needed to prevent LOC 
accidents using this intervention strategy.  Advanced modeling 
and simulation technologies must be developed for 
characterizing off-nominal condition effects on vehicle 
dynamics and control characteristics, including vehicle 
failures and damage, vehicle upset conditions, wind shear and 
turbulence, wake vortices, icing, and key combinations of 
these (as identified in Reference [3]).  This capability can be 
utilized for improved crew training under off-nominal 
conditions, and for the development and validation of 
advanced onboard integrated systems technologies.  
Databases, models, and real-time modeling methods can also 
be utilized onboard the aircraft for characterizing and 
assessing the effects of off-nominal conditions.  Enhanced 
models, databases, and simulations can also be utilized for 
improved crew training under LOC conditions. 
Figure 4.  Example Generalized LOC Accident Sequence and 
Intervention Strategy [6].
Vehicle health management (VHM) technologies must be 
developed for continually assessing and predicting the health 
of the airframe, propulsion system, and avionics systems in 
real-time, as well as remaining useful life.  In-situ sensing and 
estimation methods are needed for distinguishing between 
anomalous system behavior and external disturbances.  These 
technologies provide the capability to prevent catastrophic 
failures and damage through the early detection of anomalies, 
as well as the capability to rapidly detect, identify, 
characterize, and contain failures and damage when they do 
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Flight safety assurance (FSA) technologies must be 
developed to provide the capability of continually assessing 
and predicting the impact of off-nominal conditions on vehicle 
flight safety, and to provide resilient guidance and control 
capabilities under off-nominal conditions.  These capabilities 
can be utilized onboard the aircraft for mitigation of system 
failures and vehicle impairment or damage, external 
disturbance rejection, and upset prevention and recovery.  
They can also be utilized to support improved crew training, 
especially for providing insight into non-intuitive control 
strategies required for upset recovery.  Resilient guidance 
functions, such as trajectory generation under vehicle 
constraints (e.g., vehicle impairment or damage), must also be 
developed.   
Figure 5.  A Holistic Approach to Prevent Aircraft LOC 
Accidents [6].
Effective crew-system interface technologies must be 
developed for providing improved situational awareness and 
crew response under off-nominal conditions.  These 
technologies include effective visual and aural methods for 
notification and cueing, and variable autonomy systems that 
enable optimal partitioning of authority between the crew and 
automation.  Effective information exchange and coordination 
between the vehicle and airspace operations must also be 
achieved.  Remote sensing technologies must be developed for 
avoidance of external hazards and disturbances.   
Validation and verification (V&V) technologies must be 
developed for the comprehensive evaluation of these 
technologies for operation under off-nominal conditions, and 
to enable the identification of system limitations and 
constraints as well as safe and unsafe operating conditions 
(and their boundaries).   
Based on the holistic approach of Figure 5, an onboard 
integrated systems concept can be developed.  One such 
concept, called AIRSAFE, is presented in Figure 6, including 
a detailed depiction of subsystem functions and capabilities.  
The core subsystems include vehicle health management 
(shown in green), vehicle flight safety management and 
resilient control (shown in blue), and crew-system interfaces 
(shown in yellow).   
Figure 6.  Aircraft Integrated Resilient Safety Assurance & 
Failsafe Enhancement (AIRSAFE) System Concept and 
Functions [6].
Onboard modeling capability is reflected by purple.  These 
core functions and capabilities directly correlate to those 
depicted in Figure 5.  Multi-colored boxes represent shared 
functions between the associated subsystems.  A detailed 
description of the AIRSAFE System concept, including 
subsystem interfaces, is given in Reference [11], and Ref. [6] 
provides a synopsized description as well as an initial 
assessment of the potential effectiveness of the AIRSAFE 
System concept in providing LOC sequence interventions. 
IV. VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION (V&V) 
V&V becomes much more difficult for safety-critical 
resilient systems operating under off-nominal conditions, such 
as the AIRSAFE System Concept of Section III.  Due to the 
huge operational space, there are too many conditions to fully 
analyze, simulate, and test.  While there are numerous 
technical challenges associated with this problem, some key 
technical challenges are summarized below. 
 Development and Validation of Physics-Based Off-Nominal 
Conditions and Effects Models 
– Requires modeling of  
» adverse onboard conditions (e.g., faults, failures, damage)  
» abnormal flight conditions (e.g., unusual attitudes, stall, 
stall/departure, other vehicle upset conditions)  
» external hazards and disturbances (e.g., icing, wind shear, 
wake vortices, turbulence)  
» Worst-Case Combinations (as Determined from LOC 
Accident/Incident Data) 
– Requires data and/or experimental methods for off-
nominal conditions, which may not be available 
– Can involve multidisciplinary coupled effects 
– Cannot fully replicate in-flight loss-of-control  
environment
 V&V of Adaptive Diagnostic, Prognostic, and Control 
Algorithms Operating under Off-Nominal Conditions 
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– Involves a variety of nonlinear mathematical constructs 
(inference engines, probabilistic methods, physics-based, 
neural networks, artificial intelligence, etc.) 
– May involve onboard adaptation that can result in 
stochastic system behavior 
– Involves fusion and reasoning algorithms for sensor data, 
information processing, and decisions 
– Requires methods for establishing probabilities of  
» false alarms and missed detections  
» incorrect identifications and decisions 
» loss of stability, recoverability, and control  
– Requires methods & metrics for establishing off-nominal 
condition coverage, reliability, and accuracy for diverse 
algorithms & multiple objectives 
– Requires integrated multi-disciplinary system assessment 
methods
» performance assessment 
» error propagation and effects assessment 
» inter-operability effectiveness assessment 
 System Verification and Safety Assurance 
– Involves large-scale complex interconnected software 
systems 
– Involves potentially fault tolerant and reconfigurable 
hardware
– May involve adaptive and reasoning algorithms with 
stochastic behavior 
– Requires verification methods for a complex system of 
systems  
 V&V Predictive Capability Assessment 
– Requires methods to demonstrate compliance to 
certification standards for an extensive set of off-nominal 
conditions (and their combinations) that cannot be fully 
replicated 
– Requires methods for determining (and quantifying) level 
of confidence in V&V process and results for 
demonstrating compliance 
These technical challenges can be utilized in defining V&V 
process requirements.  Key components of the V&V process 
include system/subsystem validation, system/subsystem 
verification, and V&V predictive capability assessment.  Each 
of these V&V components requires the development of 
methods, tools, and testbeds to perform analysis, simulation / 
ground testing, and flight testing. Moreover, each method, 
tool, and testbed must be developed to assess system 
mitigation effectiveness under off-nominal precursor 
conditions to aircraft loss-of-control accidents in order to 
reduce (or prevent) them in the future.  V&V metrics must be 
defined for the diverse set of algorithms associated with the 
subsystems and integrated system, and new methods, tools, 
and testbeds developed (as needed) to assess these metrics.  
Based on an analysis of the V&V problem [12], the V&V 
process requirements for future systems designed for operation 
under off-nominal conditions (such as the AIRSAFE System 
concept) can be defined as depicted in Figure 7.  This figure 
shows V&V process components, methods, and some example 
algorithm validation metrics that are required for AIRSAFE 
subsystem and integrated system technologies. The core V&V 
methods of analysis, simulation/ground testing, and flight 
testing are applicable to each of the core V&V components 
and take on different meanings for each.  Metrics must be 
developed for assessment of each core component using the 
appropriate methods.  Although Figure 7 shows some example 
metrics for algorithm validation, and illustrates that these are 
dependent on the algorithm type, metrics are needed for each 
core V&V component.   
Figure 7.  V&V Process Requirements for the  
AIRSAFE System Concept [7]. 
Based on the V&V process requirements of Figure 7, a 
detailed V&V process can be developed for complex 
integrated resilient systems, such as the AIRSAFE System 
concept of Figure 6.  A high-level overview of the integrated 
V&V process is presented in Figure 8.  The colors of the 
blocks correlate to the associated AIRSAFE subsystem 
functions depicted in Figure 6 – that is, blue correlates to 
integrated resilient control and flight safety management 
functions, green represents vehicle health management 
functions, and yellow is associated with crew interface 
functions.  Multi-colored boxes in Figure 8 represent 
evaluation of the associated integrated subsystem functions.  
Analysis, simulation, and experimental V&V components are 
organized in the V&V process of Figure 8 moving from left to 
right, and system evaluation becomes more highly integrated 
moving to the center (from above and below) and to the right.  
Also as indicated in Figure 8, results from the V&V process 
are utilized as an iterative process for refining the algorithm 
design of each subsystem.  Ref. [7] presents a more detailed 
description of the controls-related components of the V&V 
process (including methods and interfaces).  This is depicted 
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in Figure 8 by the red box around the lower two rows of the 
process.  A detailed summary of recent research 
accomplishments is also provided in Ref. [7].  Reference [12] 
provides a detailed description of the entire process.   
FIGURE 8. V&V PROCESS OVERVIEW [7].
V. CONCLUSION
Aircraft loss of control is the largest aircraft accident 
category, and results in the highest number of fatalities among 
the worldwide commercial jet fleet.  It is also the most 
complex accident category, resulting from numerous causal 
and contributing factors that act individually or (more often) 
combine to result in a loss of control event (accident or 
incident).  These factors are off-nominal conditions that occur 
onboard the aircraft, as external disturbances, or as abnormal 
flight conditions.  To address aircraft loss of control, a detailed 
LOC accident analysis was performed to identify worst-case 
combinations of causal and contributing factors as well as 
their temporal ordering or sequencing in time.  The data set 
used in the analysis consisted of 126 LOC accidents that 
resulted in 6087 fatalities during the 30-year period 1979 – 
2009.  Scatter plots were used in identifying worst-case 
combinations of LOC accident precursors, and a set of 7 
generalized LOC sequences was defined, which represent 
88.9% of the accidents and 90.8% of the fatalities considered 
in this study.  Future risks with the potential to increase LOC 
accidents were also considered.   
A holistic research and technology development approach 
was presented for reducing aircraft LOC accidents, as well as 
an associated integrated system concept, called the Aircraft 
Integrated Resilient Safety Assurance and Failsafe 
Enhancement (AIRSAFE) System.   The holistic approach 
requires the development of (i) modeling and simulation 
technologies for characterizing vehicle dynamics and control 
characteristics under off-nominal precursor conditions 
associated with LOC events; (ii) vehicle health management 
technologies for the detection, identification, characterization, 
and containment of vehicle and system failures and damage 
(as well as their prevention through improved maintenance, 
inspection, and vehicle design); (iii) flight safety management 
and resilient control technologies for the rapid assessment of 
off-nominal condition effects and their mitigation; and (iv) 
crew interface technologies for improved situational 
awareness and variable autonomy under off-nominal 
conditions.   
The AIRSAFE System technologies are being developed for 
safety-critical operation under off-nominal conditions, and 
their V&V poses significant technical challenges.  The V&V 
problem and the research approach being taken to address it 
were described.  V&V process requirements were presented, 
which integrated analytical, simulation, and experimental 
methods, software tools, and testbeds.  A detailed V&V 
process was defined for application to the AIRSAFE System 
concept.  
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